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Recently, a number of macroeconometric studies emphasize the role of antici-
pated shocks as sources of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations. Beaudry and Portier
(2006) ﬁnd that more than one half of business cycle ﬂuctuations are caused
by news concerning future technological opportunities. Davis (2007) and Fuji-
wara, Hirose, and Shintani (2008) analyze the importance of anticipated shocks
in large scale DSGE models and report that these disturbances are important
components of aggregate ﬂuctuations. Schmitt-Groh´ e and Uribe (2008) conduct
a Bayesian estimation of a real-business cycle model and ﬁnd that anticipated
shocks are the most important source of aggregate ﬂuctuations. In particu-
lar, they report that anticipated shocks explain two thirds of the volatility in
consumption, output, investment, and employment.
In light of these ﬁndings, Wohltmann and Winkler (2008) investigate, wheth-
er the anticipation of future cost-push shocks has a stabilizing eﬀect on the
economy and thus reduces the welfare loss compared to unanticipated shocks.
In order to provide analytical results which do not rely on calibrations, they
consider the baseline New Keynesian model with purely forward-looking IS and
Phillips curves. This enables them to derive an analytical solution of welfare as
a function of the time span between the anticipation and the realization of the
shock. They ﬁnd that – for empirically plausible degrees of nominal rigidity –
the anticipation of a future cost-push shock leads to a higher welfare loss than
an analogous unanticipated shock.
In order to conduct an analysis of the (welfare) eﬀects of anticipated shocks
in more elaborate models, this paper presents a general solution method for
linear dynamic rational expectations models with anticipated shocks and opti-
mal policy. Our method extends the work of S¨ oderlind (1999), who uses the
generalized Schur decomposition method, advocated by Klein (2000), to solve
linear rational expectations models with optimal policy. However, S¨ oderlind
(1999) only considers stochastic models with white noise shocks which are, by
deﬁnition, unpredictable. In the case of anticipated shocks, the occurrence of
all future shocks is known exactly at the time when the solution of the model is
computed. Our method also contains unanticipated shocks as a limiting case.
As an economic example, we lay out a calibrated New Keynesian model for
a closed and cashless economy with internal habit formation in consumption
preferences, a variant of Calvo price staggering with partial indexation to past
inﬂation and a time-varying wage mark-up which represents a typical cost-push
shock. We compare the eﬀects of mark-up shocks under optimal monetary
policy for diﬀerent lengths of the anticipation period. Our results conﬁrm the
ﬁnding of Wohltmann and Winkler (2008) who show that anticipated shocks
entail higher welfare losses than unexpected cost shocks.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses optimal policies in
RE models with anticipated temporary shocks. We ﬁrst determine the optimal
unrestricted policy under precommitment and calculate the minimum value of
the intertemporal loss function. We then consider (optimal) simple rules and
demonstrate how the Schur decomposition can be used to solve the model under
these conditions. Section 3 derives the hybrid New Keynesian model, presents
1the welfare-theoretic loss function and discusses the eﬀects of anticipated and
unanticipated cost-push shocks. Finally, section 4 provides concluding remarks.
In the Appendix, we present a short discussion of the well known stochastic case
with white noise shocks.
2 The Model











+ Cut + Dνt+1 (1)
where wt is an n1 × 1 vector of predetermined variables, assuming w0 given, vt
an n2 × 1 vector of non-predetermined variables, ut an m × 1 vector of policy
instruments, and νt+1 an r × 1 vector of exogenous shocks. The matrices A
and B are n × n (where n = n1 + n2), while the matrices C and D are n × m
and n × r respectively. We allow matrix A to be singular which is the case if
static (intratemporal) equations are included among the dynamic relationships.
The vector w, composed of backward-looking variables can include exogenous
variables following autoregressive processes. Et vt+1 denotes model consistent
(rational) expectations of vt+1 formed at time t. We assume that the shocks
are anticipated by the public in advance and take the following form
νt =
 
ν for t = τ > 0
0 for t  = τ
(2)
where ν = (ν1,...,νr)′ is a constant non-zero r × 1 vector. It is assumed that
at time t = 0 the public anticipates a shock of the form outlined in (2) to
take place at some future date τ > 0. Note that τ also deﬁnes the lengths
of the anticipation period. Since the shocks are anticipated by the public we
have Et νt+1 = νt+1. For notational convenience, we deﬁne the n × 1 vector
kt = (w′
t,v′
t)′ and the n3 × 1 target vector st = ˜ Akt + ˜ But, where the matrices
˜ A and ˜ B are n3 × n and n3 × m respectively. Assume that the policy maker´s










where W1 and W2 are symmetric and non-negative deﬁnite matrices and λ is a








t+i ˜ Wkt+i + 2k′
t+iPut+i + u′
t+iRut+i} (4)
where ˜ W = ˜ A′W1 ˜ A and R = W2 + ˜ B′W1 ˜ B are symmetric and non-negative
deﬁnite and P = ˜ A′W1 ˜ B.
22.1 Optimal Policy with Precommitment
In the following, the policy maker´s optimal policy rule at time t = 0 is de-













t+1[Bkt + Cut + Dνt+1 − Akt+1]} (5)
with the n×1 multiplier ρt+1, we get the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to














































t)′ by placing the predetermined vector pvt after wt. Since vt
is forward-looking with arbitrarily chosen initial value v0, the corresponding
Lagrange multiplier pvt is predetermined with initial value pv0 = 0. Re-order
the columns of the (2n + m) × (2n + m) matrices in (6) according to the re-
ordering of (k′
t,u′



















where ˜ wt = (w′
t,p′
vt)′ and ˜ vt = (v′
t,u′
t,p′
wt)′. The n × 1 vector ˜ wt contains the
’backward-looking’ variables of (6) while the (n+m)×1 vector ˜ vt contains the
’forward-looking’ variables.
Equation (6) implies that the (2n + m) × (2n + m) matrix F is singular.
To solve equation (7) we apply the generalized Schur decomposition method
(S¨ oderlind, 1999; Klein, 2000). The decomposition of the square matrices F
and G is given by
F = Q
′SZ




QFZ = S, QGZ = T (9)
where Q,Z,S, and T are square matrices of complex numbers, S and T are
upper triangular and Q and Z are unitary, i.e.
Q   Q
′ = Q
′   Q = I(2n+m)×(2n+m) = Z   Z
′ = Z
′   Z (10)
3where the non-singular matrix Q
′
is the transpose of Q, which denotes the
complex conjugate of Q. Z
′ is the transpose of the complex conjugate of Z.
The matrices S and T can be arranged in such a way that the block with the
stable generalized eigenvalues (the ith diagonal element of T divided by the ith
diagonal element of S) comes ﬁrst. Premultiply both sides of equation (7) with

















































where the n×n matrix S11 and the (n+m)×(n+m) matrix T22 are invertible
while S22 is singular. The square matrix T11 may also be singular. The lower
block of equation (13) contains the unstable generalized eigenvalues and must
be solved forward. Since
˜ xt+s = M2˜ xt+s+1 − T−1
22 Q2νt+s+1 (s = 0,1,2,...) (14)
where M2 = T−1
22 S22, the unique stable solution for ˜ xt is given by










22 Q2ν for 0 ≤ t < τ
0 for t ≥ τ
(15)
The upper block of (13) contains the stable generalized eigenvalues and can
be solved backward. Since
˜ zt+1 = M1˜ zt + S−1
11 (T12˜ xt − S12˜ xt+1) + S−1
11 Q1νt+1 (16)
where M1 = S−1
11 T11 (which in general is not invertible), the general solution is
given by






11 (T12˜ xs − S12˜ xs+1 + Q1νs+1)
=

    












11 (T12˜ xs − S12˜ xs+1)
+Mt−τ
1 S−1
11 Q1ν for t ≥ τ
(17)
4where ˜ xs is deﬁned in (15).
The solution for t ≥ τ can be rewritten as
˜ zt = Mt−τ
1 ˜ K for t ≥ τ (18)
where













22 Q2ν for 0 ≤ s < τ
0 for s ≥ τ
(20)
we can write ˜ K as
˜ K = Mτ
1K + S−1






























˜ W1 as well as ˜ W2 is a ﬁnite geometric sum of matrices and can be written as
˜ W1 = S−1
11 T12 − Mτ
1S−1
11 T12Mτ
2 + M1 ˜ W1M2 (24)
and
˜ W2 = S−1
11 S12 − Mτ−1
1 S−1
11 S12Mτ−1
2 + M1 ˜ W2M2 (25)
To solve for ˜ W1 and ˜ W2 respectively, we use the matrix identities (Rude-
busch and Svensson 1999; Klein, 2000) vec(A + B) = vec(A) + vec(B) and
vec(ABC) = [C′ ⊗ A]vec(B) where vec(A) denotes the vector of stacked col-
umn vectors of the matrix A and ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product of matrices.
We then obtain from (24) and (25)
vec ˜ W1 − [M′
2 ⊗ M1]vec ˜ W1 = vec[S−1





vec ˜ W2 − [M′
2 ⊗ M1]vec ˜ W2 = vec[S−1





vec ˜ W1 = [I − M′
2 ⊗ M1]−1   vec[S−1




vec ˜ W2 = [I − M′
2 ⊗ M1]−1   vec[S−1




According to (17) and (20), the solution of ˜ zt for the anticipation period
0 < t < τ can be rewritten as












































1tM2 (0 ≤ t < τ) (33)
with the solution
vec W∗
1t = [I − M′















2tM2 (0 ≤ t < τ) (35)
with the solution
vec W∗
2t = [I − M′






The constant K can be determined using the initial value of the predeter-
mined vector ˜ w. By premultiplying equation (11) with Z and by partitioning














2Note that equation (33) is also well-deﬁned for t = τ. In this case it is equivalent to (24)
implying W
∗
1τ = ˜ W1.
3For t = τ − 1 equation (35) is equivalent to (25) so that W
∗
2τ−1 = ˜ W2. Then, according to
(21), ˜ K = ˜ zτ = M
τ
1 K + S
−1







The deﬁnition of W
∗
1t implies that W
∗









1t (0 ≤ t ≤ τ − 1)
with the initial value W
∗
1 0 = 0. Analogical, W
∗











2 0 = 0)




2 generally does not exist.
6and therefore
˜ w0 = Z11˜ z0 + Z12˜ x0 (38)
with ˜ w0 = (w′
0,0′
n2×1)′, ˜ z0 = K, and
˜ x0 = −Mτ−1
2 T−1
22 Q2ν (39)
where it is assumed that τ > 0.4 Equation (38) implies
K = Z−1
11 ˜ w0 − Z−1
11 Z12˜ x0 (40)
provided the inverse Z−1
11 exists. A necessary condition is that the dynamic
system (7) has the saddle path property, i.e., that the number of backward-
looking variables (n1 +n2 = n) coincides with the number of stable generalized
eigenvalues (S¨ oderlind, 1999; Klein, 2000].
In the case τ > 0 we can assume w0 = 0 so that according to (39) the





























If Z11 is invertible, equation (37) implies
˜ vt = Z21˜ zt + Z22˜ xt = Z21(Z−1
11 ˜ wt − Z−1
11 Z12˜ xt) + Z22˜ xt = N ˜ wt + ˆ Z˜ xt (45)
where N = Z21Z−1
11 and ˆ Z = Z22 − Z21Z−1


























 ˜ xt (46)









11 Q1ν implying ˜ z0 = K + S
−1
11 Q1ν and K = Z
−1
11 ˜ w0 − S
−1
11 Q1ν with w0  = 0. By
contrast, the initial value w0 can be normalized to zero if τ > 0.
5φ
∗







11 [−T12M2 + S12]M
τ−t−2
2
where the time index t must be restricted to 0 ≤ t < τ − 1.
7and assume the n2×n2 matrix N12 is invertible. The optimal policy rule under
commitment can then be written as
ut = N21wt + N22pv t + ˆ Z2˜ xt
= N21wt + N22N−1
12 (vt − N11wt − ˆ Z1˜ xt) + ˆ Z2˜ xt
= N22N−1
12 vt + (N21 − N22N−1
12 N11)wt + ( ˆ Z2 − N22N−1
12 ˆ Z1)˜ xt (47)
where ˜ xt is given by (15). For t < τ, ut depends on the auxiliary variable ˜ xt,
while for t ≥ τ, ut is only a linear function of the predetermined state variables
wt and pvt, where pvt can be substituted with the original state variables vt and
wt.
Minimum Value of the Loss Function
To determine the minimum value of the loss function Jt at time t = 0, we





























where the (n + m) × (n + m) matrix H is given by
H =




with H = H′. Deﬁne the n1 × n matrix ˜ D1 and the (n2 + m) × (n + m)
matrix ˜ D2 by ˜ D1 = (In1×n1,0n1×n2) and ˜ D2 = (I(n2+m)×(n2+m),0(n2+m)×n1),
respectively. Then w = ˜ D1(w′,p′
v)′ = ˜ D1 ˜ w′, (v′,u′)′ = ˜ D2(v′,u′,p′
w)′ = ˜ D2˜ v′,
(w′,v′,u′)′ = ˜ D( ˜ w′, ˜ v′)′ with
˜ D =





In1×n1 0n1×n2 0n1×(n2+m) 0n1×n1
0(n2+m)×n1 0(n+m)×n2 I(n2+m)×(n2+m) 0(n2+m)×n1
 
(50)



















































8First, we calculate J
(2)
t . For t ≥ τ, we have ˜ vt = N ˜ wt and ˜ wt = Z11˜ zt,
where N = Z21Z−1
11 . We then obtain ( ˜ w′
t, ˜ v′
t)′ = ˜ N ˜ wt = ˜ NZ11˜ zt, where ˜ N =
(In×n,N′)′ is a (2n + m) × n matrix. J
(2)













































where ϕt = Mt







which is of dimension n × n and satisﬁes the matrix equation




vec(V ∗) = [I − λM′
1 ⊗ M1]−1 vec(Z′
11H∗Z11) (58)










λτ trace(V ∗ ˜ K ˜ K′) (59)
with ˜ K given by (21).
The next step is the calculation of the ﬁnite sum J
(1)
t as deﬁned in (52).
Because ( ˜ w′
t, ˜ v′
t)′ = Z(˜ z′
t, ˜ x′






























where ˜ H = Z′ ˜ D′H ˜ DZ.

























9where µ = T−1












































= ˜ MΞt + ΩMτ−t−2






























Note that the dynamic equation (62) is not deﬁned for t = τ − 1, since M2 =
T−1
22 S22 is generally not invertible. The solution time path for Ξt (0 ≤ t < τ −1)
can be obtained by either solving equation (62) backward or – if possible – by
solving equation (62) forward.
Solving (62) backward in time yields





To obtain the forward solution assume that M1 = S−1
11 T11 is invertible. Then
˜ M−1 exists and equation (62) can be written as



























































2 (0 ≤ t < τ − 2) (68)












λτ trace(V ∗ ˜ K ˜ K′) (69)
Obviously, the value of J0 depends on the size of the lead time τ. In New
Keynesian models we often have a hump-shaped pattern for the function J0 =
J0(τ) where J0 is increasing in τ for small values of τ (see Section 3).







˜ K′V ∗ ˜ K (70)
where
˜ K = K




11 Q1ν = Z−1
11 ˜ w0 − S−1
11 Q1ν + S−1
11 Q1ν = Z−1
















trace(V ˜ w0 ˜ w′
0) (72)
where















and V = Z−1′
11 V ∗Z−1
11 satisﬁes the matrix equation
V = Z−1′
11 V ∗Z−1











11 = H∗ + λΓ′V Γ (74)
with Γ = Z11M1Z−1
11 .
2.2 (Optimal) Simple Rules
The policy maker could alternatively commit to a suboptimal simple rule of the
form
ut = Λkt + ΨEt kt+1 (75)
where the constant matrices Λ and Ψ are m×n. Assuming rational expectations








































where ˜ w = w is an n1×1 vector, ˜ v = (v′,u′)′ is an (n2+m)×1 vector and where
the square matrices F and G are (n + m) × (n + m) with the decomposition















the matrices Z11, Z12, Z21, and Z22 are now n1×n1, n1×(n2+m), (n2+m)×n1,
and (n2 + m) × (n2 + m) respectively. The auxiliary variables ˜ z and ˜ x satisfy






















where S11 and T11 are n1 × n1 matrices, S22 and T22 are (n2 + m) × (n2 + m)
and S12 and T12 are n1 × (n2 + m). The matrices Q1 and Q2 are n1 × r and











The solution of (79) is given by (15) and (17). For t ≥ τ, we obtain ˜ vt = N ˜ wt =
Nwt, where N = Z21Z−1
11 is now an (n2 + m) × n1 matrix.














since ˜ D1 = In1×n1, ˜ D2 = I(n2+m)×(n2+m) and therefore ˜ D = I(n+m)×(n+m)
(cf. (50)). Jt can be partitioned using (51). J
(2)
t can be written as (54) with
H∗ = ˜ N′H ˜ N and ˜ N = (In1×n1,N′)′. The value of the loss function J0 for given









in (59) and (61) respectively.
The minimization of J0 with respect to the coeﬃcients of the matrices Λ
and Ψ yields an optimal simple rule of the form (75).
3 Example: A Hybrid New Keynesian Model
The model is a standard New Keynesian model for a closed and cashless econ-
omy with the additional features of internal habit formation in consumption
preferences and a variant of the Calvo (1983) mechanism with partial indexa-
tion of non-optimized prices to past inﬂation.6 The economy consists of ﬁnal
6Similar models are applied by Smets and Wouters (2003), Giannoni and Woodford (2004), or
Casares (2006).
12goods producers, labor bundlers, households, and intermediate goods produc-
ers.
Final goods producers use a continuum of intermediate goods Yt(i) to pro-
duce the homogenous ﬁnal good Yt in a perfectly competitive market. A ﬁnal
goods producer maximizes his proﬁts PtYt −
  1
0 Pt(i)Yt(i)di, subject to the fol-
lowing CES production function
Yt =







where Pt is the price of the ﬁnal good, Pt(i) is the price of the intermediate
good i, and (1 + λp) is the mark-up in the intermediate goods market.
The ﬁrst-order condition for proﬁt maximization yields the demand function









and the equation for marginal costs
Pt =







Analogously to ﬁnal goods producers, labor bundlers buy diﬀerentiated la-
bor types Nt(j), aggregate them to Nt and sell it to the intermediate goods
producers under perfectly competitive conditions. A bundler maximizes his
proﬁts WtNt−
  1
0 Wt(j)Nt(j)dj, subject to the following CES aggregation func-
tion
Nt =







Wt is the price of the labor bundle Nt, Wt(j) denotes the price of labor type j
and (1 + λw,t) is the time-varying wage mark-up.
The ﬁrst-order condition for proﬁt maximization yields the demand function









and the wage index equation
Wt =







The economy is made up by a continuum of households, indexed by j ∈ [0,1].
Each household j is a monopolistic supplier of labor type Nt(j). The household
determines the amount of the ﬁnal good Ct(j) for consumption, its one-period
13nominal bond holdings Bt(j), and chooses the wage for its labor type Wt(j) in
















where β is the discount factor, σ ≥ 1 is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution in consumption, and η is the inverse of the labor supply elasticity.
Ct−1(j) is the consumption of the jth household in period t−1 and Nt(j) are the
total hours worked. We assume h ≥ 0 to allow for internal habit formation in
consumption. Maximization of (88) is subjected to the labor demand function












where Rt is the one-period gross nominal interest rate on households jth nom-
inal bond holdings Bt(j), and Dr
t(j) are dividends, expressed in real terms.




(Ct − hCt−1)−σ − hβ(Ct+1 − hCt)−σ










(Ct − hCt−1)−σ − hβ(Ct+1 − hCt)−σ
 
(91)
where πt = Pt/Pt−1 is the gross rate of price inﬂation. We make use of the fact
that all households are faced with the same optimization problem and hence,
choose the same amount of consumption Ct(j) = Ct, the same nominal wage
Wt(j) = Wt, and supply the same amount of labor Nt(j) = Nt.
Each intermediate goods producer is a monopolistic supplier of the inter-
mediate good i ∈ [0,1]. Firm i uses the amount Nt(i) of homogenous labor and
the constant returns to scale technology Yt(i) = Nt(i), to produce its interme-
diate good Yt(i). Real marginal costs are the same for all ﬁrms and is given by
MCt(i) = Wt/Pt.
The price-setting decision for proﬁt-maximization is constrained by a stan-
dard Calvo mechanism. In each period, the intermediate goods producer faces
the constant probability 1 − θ of being allowed to re-optimize his price Pt(i).
We follow Smets and Wouters (2003) by assuming that a ﬁrm which cannot
re-optimize his price, resets the price according to Pt(i) = Pt−1(i)π
γ
t−1, where γ



















Yt+k for k = 0,1,2,... (93)








The ﬁrst-order condition for the price-setting problem yields
P∗










































where µp = 1 + λp.
Since all ﬁrms which are allowed to re-optimize their price will choose the
same price P∗
t (i) = P∗















Log-linearizing equation (96) yields
ˆ P∗
t − ˆ Pt =
θ
1 − θ
(ˆ πt − γˆ πt−1) (97)
Note that we use the convention that a hat above a variable denotes the per-
centage deviation from its steady-state value.
By combining the latter equation with the log-linearized price-setting con-







Et ˆ πt+1 + Θ ˆ MCt (98)
where Θ =
(1−βθ)(1−θ)
θ(1+βγ) . By log-linearizing the optimality condition (91), using
the log-linearized overall resource constraint ˆ Yt = ˆ Ct and using the fact that
\ Wt/Pt =   MCt and ˆ Yt = ˆ Nt, we obtain
  MCt = ˆ λw,t + (η + δ1)ˆ Yt − δ2 ˆ Yt−1 − βδ2 Et ˆ Yt+1 (99)
where δ1 =
σ(1+βh2)
(1−h)(1−βh), δ2 = hσ
(1−h)(1−βh). The log-linearized mark-up ˆ λw,t is
described by the AR(1) process
ˆ λw,t = ρˆ λw,t−1 + et (100)
By inserting the latter equation into equation (98), we obtain a hybrid Phillips
curve that follows





1+βγ ω3 = Θ(η + δ1), and ω4 = Θδ2.
Note that in our model the level of output in the absence of nominal rigidities
(the natural level) Y n
t is constant. Thus, the linearized output ˆ Yt coincides with
the linearized output gap ˆ Y
g
t = ˆ Yt − ˆ Y n
t , where ˆ Y n
t = 0. Further note that for
γ = 0, equation (101) collapses into the purely forward-looking New Keynesian
Phillips curve.
By log-linearizing the optimality condition (90) and using ˆ Yt = ˆ Ct, we obtain
ˆ Yt = κ1ρˆ Yt−1 + κ2 Et ˆ Yt+1 − κ3 Et ˆ Yt+2 − κ4( ˆ Rt − Et ˆ πt+1) (102)
where κ1 = h
1+h+βh2, κ2 =
1+βh+βh2
1+h+βh2 , κ3 =
βh
1+h+βh2, and κ4 =
(1−h)(1−βh)
σ(1+h+βh2).
Note that for h = 0, we obtain the purely forward-looking New Keynesian IS
curve.
Following Woodford (2003, Ch. 6) and Giannoni and Woodford (2004), a












(1+λp)δ(1−βh)(1−h) and δ is the smaller root of the quadratic equation
hσ
(1 − βh)(1 − h)








We follow Giannoni and Woodford (2004) and Casares (2006) by assuming
that the monetary authority is concerned about the volatility of the nominal
interest rate. Therefore, we augment the welfare-theoretic loss function by the
additional term αR ˆ R2
t, where αR measures the weight on interest rate stabiliza-
tion.










subject to the model equations (100), (101), and (102). Note that in our model,
the discount factor for the policy-maker, λ, is equal to the household’s discount
factor β.
In order to solve the model by using the methods outlined in Section 2, we
deﬁne the policy objective parameters ˆ Y o
t = ˆ Yt − δˆ Yt−1 and ˆ πo
t = ˆ πt − γˆ πt−1.
Furthermore, we deﬁne the auxiliary variables   πt = ˆ πt−1,   Yt = ˆ Yt−1, and st =
Et ˆ πt+1. If we add the deﬁnition of the real interest rate ˆ rt = ˆ Rt − Et ˆ πt+1,
we ﬁnally obtain a 3 × 1 vector wt of predetermined variables given by wt =
(ˆ λw,t,  πt,   Yt)′, a 6 × 1 vector vt of non-predetermined variables given by vt =
(ˆ πt, ˆ Yt,st, ˆ rt, ˆ πo
t, ˆ yo
t)′, the vector of policy instruments ut which is simply the
scalar ut = ˆ Rt, and the 1 × 1 shock vector νt = et. The 9 × 9 matrices A and












1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0
β
1+βγ −βω4 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 κ4 κ2 −κ3 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0






















ρ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
−Θ −
γ
1+βγ ω4 1 −ω3 0 0 0 0
0 0 −κ1 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 γ 0 −1 0 0 0 1 0











while the 9 × 1 matrices C and D are
C =
 




1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 ′











0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0










We complete the description of the model by presenting the calibration.
The time unit is one quarter. The discount rate is equal to β = 0.99, implying
a quarterly steady-state real interest rate of approximately one percent. The
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σ, is assumed to σ = 2. We follow
Casares (2006) and set the habit formation parameter to h = 0.85 implying that
the weight on lagged output in the IS equation is 1/3. The calibrated η = 3
implies a labor supply elasticity with respect to the real wage of 1/3. λp is set to
8/7 which implies a steady-state mark-up in the goods market of approximately
1714 percent. We assume the linearized wage mark-up ˆ λw,t to be persistent and
choose ρ equal to 0.8. The Calvo parameter θ is set to 0.75 implying an average
duration of price contracts of one year. The price indexation parameter γ is
set to 0.45 which is roughly equal to the value reported by Smets and Wouters
(2003). This implies that the weight on lagged inﬂation in the Phillips curve
equation is 0.31.
The parameter values chosen for our model imply a weight on output in
the policy-makers’ objective function of approximately αY = 0.69. Following
Casares (2006), we set αR = 0.0088 implying a small preference for interest rate
smoothing.
For the analysis concerning anticipated and unanticipated shocks, we as-
sume that the economy is in a deterministic steady-state until period t = 0. In
the case of an unanticipated shock, the mark-up ˆ λw,t jumps by one percent in
period t = 0 and begins to fall thereafter. In the case of an anticipated shock,
the agents anticipate in period t = 0 that a one percent increase in the mark-up
will take place at some future date τ > 0. They also know that the mark-up
will subsequently decline according to the autoregressive process (100), where
now et = 1 for t = τ and et = 0 for t  = τ. Note that τ also deﬁnes the lengths of
the anticipation period or the time interval between t = 0 and t = τ. In order
to obtain impulse response functions and welfare results, we simulate dynamic
adjustment paths and the welfare loss function by using the methods outlined
in Section 2.7
Figure 1 depicts the impulse response functions of inﬂation, output, nominal,
and real interest rates under the unrestricted optimal monetary policy. The
solid lines with circles represent the responses to an unforeseen cost-push shock
that emerged in period t = 0. The solid lines with squares, triangles, and stars
represent responses to a cost-push shock whose realization in period τ = 1,
τ = 2, or τ = 3 is anticipated in period t = 0.
An unanticipated rise in the wage mark-up puts upward pressure on the
prices of intermediate goods and hence on inﬂation. Despite the instantaneous
jump in inﬂation, the real interest rate rises due to the sharp increase in the
nominal interest rate. The increase in the real interest rate induces households
to postpone consumption which implies an abrupt drop in output. Subse-
quently, the nominal interest rate continues to rise. This leads – in conjunction
with the decline in inﬂation – to hump-shaped response functions of the real
interest rate and output.
In the case of anticipated shocks, the optimal policy calls for a decline in
nominal and real interest rates in response to the anticipation of a future rise
in marginal costs. At the latest with the occurrence of the anticipated shock in
period τ, the nominal and real interest rates start to rise and display a hump-
shaped development. Inﬂation declines in response to the anticipation of the
future rise in marginal costs. After this initial decline, inﬂation starts to rise and
peaks in the period when the anticipated shock materializes. Output displays a
hump-shaped downturn, starting at the point of anticipation, t = 0. The drop
7Matlab codes can be downloaded from the author’s webpage at http://www.wiso.uni-
kiel.de/vwlinstitute/Wohltmann/REAS solution.zip.






























































































































Figure 1: Impulse response functions under unrestricted optimal monetary policy.
Notes: Solid lines with circles denote responses to an unanticipated cost-push
shock, solid lines with squares, triangles, and stars denote responses to an anticipated
cost-push shock taking place in period τ = 1, τ = 2, and τ = 3.
in output is thereby ampliﬁed by the lengths of the anticipation period, τ.
Notably, the anticipation of future shocks leads to an increase in the per-
sistence (or volatility) of inﬂation, output as well as nominal and real interest
rates which increases in lead time τ. Thereby, persistence is measured as the
total variation of a variable over time, i.e. by its intertemporal deviation from
its initial steady-state. The impact or anticipation eﬀect, however, is inversely
related to the time span between anticipation and realization of the cost-push
shock. It measures the initial jump of a variable taking place at the time of
anticipation.
The opposing eﬀects of anticipations are shown in Figure 2 which displays
the welfare loss as a function of the time span between the anticipation and the
occurrence of the cost-push shock. The welfare function exhibits a hump-shaped
pattern implying that for a realistic time span between the anticipation and the
realization of cost-push shocks, anticipated shocks entail higher welfare losses
than unanticipated shocks of equal size. The rationale is that the anticipation
eﬀect is dominated by the persistence eﬀect. A welfare gain from anticipating
can only be achieved for very large values of τ. Besides the anticipation eﬀect,
this can also be explained by discounting the realization impacts from period τ
to period t = 0.












Figure 2: Welfare loss for diﬀerent lengths of the anticipation period under unre-
stricted optimal monetary policy
The results we obtained from our simulations show that the welfare loss of
anticipated cost-shocks exceeds the welfare loss of an unanticipated cost-shock
of equal magnitude for plausible lengths of the anticipation period. Hence,
our results strongly support the ﬁndings of Wohltmann and Winkler (2008)
who report a similar result within the purely forward-looking canonical New
Keynesian model.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a method to solve linear dynamic rational expec-
tations models with anticipated shocks and optimal policy by using the gen-
eralized Schur decomposition method. Furthermore, we determine the opti-
mal unrestricted and restricted policy responses to anticipated shocks. Our
approach also allows for the evaluation of the widely discussed case of unpre-
dictable shocks and can therefore be seen as a generalization of the methods
summarized by S¨ oderlind (1999). We demonstrated our method by means of a
calibrated New Keynesian model with internal habit formation in consumption
preferences, a variant of Calvo price staggering with partial indexation to past
inﬂation, a time-varying wage mark-up which represents a typical cost-push
shock, and a utility-based loss function. We simulated the model economy’s
responses to unanticipated and anticipated cost-push shocks under the unre-
stricted optimal monetary policy. We then showed that anticipated shocks
amplify both, the stagﬂationary eﬀects of cost-push shocks and the overall wel-
fare loss. Hence, our results strongly support the previous work by Wohltmann
and Winkler (2008) who ﬁnd welfare-reducing eﬀects of anticipations within the
purely forward-looking canonical New Keynesian model.
20Appendix
The Stochastic Case
We now assume that νt+1 is an r × 1 vector of independent and identically
distributed white noise disturbances with variance-covariance matrix Σνν =
E(νtν′
t). The i.i.d shocks are, by deﬁnition, unpredictable (τ = 0) and occur at
time t = 0. Since Et(νt+1) = 0r×1, equation (7) implies












































and ˜ xt = 0 for all t ≥ T = 0. Partitioning the matrices A and B in equation












Equation (1) then implies
A11wt+1 + A12 Et vt+1 = B11wt + B12vt + C1ut + D1νt+1 (A5)
and













From (A5) and (A6) we get
A11(wt+1 − Et wt+1) = D1νt+1 (A8)
so that
wt+1 − Et wt+1 = A−1
11 D1νt+1 (A9)
holds (provided A−1
11 exists). The corresponding equation for the costate vector
pv is given by (Backus and Driﬃll, 1986)
pv,t+1 − Et pv,t+1 = 0n2×1 (A10)
21Deﬁning ˜ wt = (w′
t,p′
vt)′ and using equations (A2) and (A3) then imply
˜ wt+1 − Et ˜ wt+1 = Z11(˜ zt+1 − Et ˜ zt+1) = Z11(˜ zt+1 − S−1








˜ zt+1 = (S−1

















The solution of the VAR(1) process (A12) has the general form














K = ˜ z0 = Z−1







Since E0 νs+1 = 0 the expected time path of ˜ zt is given by
E0 ˜ zt = (S−1
11 T11)tZ−1
11 ˜ w0 (A15)
Premultiplying equation (A12) with Z11 and using ˜ wt = Z11˜ zt to obtain the
VAR(1) process






















and the expected future path of ˜ wt is given by







The solution to the forward-looking vector ˜ vt follows from
˜ vt = Z21˜ zt = Z21Z−1
11 ˜ wt = N ˜ wt (N = Z21Z−1
11 ) (A20)
by inserting the solution time path of ˜ wt.



































































where we have used E0 εs+1 = 0. V =
 ∞
i=0 λiΓi′H∗Γi satisﬁes the matrix
equation (cf. (74))















0V ˜ w0 =
1
2
trace(V ˜ w0 ˜ w′
0) (A24)











= E0(Γi−1ε1 + Γi−2ε2 + ... + Γ0εi)′H∗(Γi−1ε1 + Γi−2ε2 + ... + Γ0εi)
= E0(Γi−1ε1)′H∗(Γi−1ε1) + E0(Γi−2ε2)′H∗(Γi−2ε2) + ... + E0(Γ0εi)′H∗(Γ0εi)
= E0 ε′












iεj) = 0 for i  = j. The variance-covariance matrix
E0(εiε′
i) = E0(εjε′
j) = Σεε (A26)





















with V deﬁned as in equation (A23). The optimal value of the loss function J0











Note that (A28) is a generalization of equation (72) where we have assumed a
deterministic shock in t = 0 (Σεε = 0). The formula (A28) holds for a discount
factor λ with 0 < λ < 1.8 The right-hand side of (A28) is not deﬁned in the
special case λ = 1. If the discount factor λ approaches unity we must scale the
intertemporal loss function J0 by the factor (1 − λ) (Rudebusch and Svensson,
1999). Equation (A28) then implies
(1 − λ)J0 =
1
2













Note that in the case T = 0 and λ = 1 the RHS of (A30) equals the RHS of (72)
provided w0w′
0 = Σεε. In this special case the stochastic and deterministic case
are equivalent. If the oﬀ-diagonal elements of W1 and W2 in the loss function
(3) are equal to zero, then the limit value of (1 − λ)J0 can be expressed as
lim
λ→1
































The period-loss-function can also be written as





t) and H as deﬁned in (49). Then the unconditional period
loss also fulﬁlls
E(Lt) = E(Y ′
tHYt) = trace(HΣY Y ) (A35)
where ΣY Y is the unconditional variance-covariance matrix of the vector Y .
8In the deterministic case, where Σεε = 0, (A28) also holds for λ = 1.
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